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In the last fifteen years or so,lawyers working in law
and economics and economists with an interest in le-
gal matters have turned their attention to the topic
of bankruptcy.A large amount of work has resulted,
both theoretical and empirical, some of which has
been concerned with the functioning of existing
bankruptcy procedures and some with bankruptcy
reform. Although researchers in this area have ex-
pressed different views,I believe that one can identi-
fy a consensus on certain issues, e.g., the goals of
bankruptcy and some of the characteristics of an ef-
ficient bankruptcy procedure.(There is probably less
agreement about exactly what the best bankruptcy
procedure is or how well existing systems around the
world function.) In this paper I will focus on this con-
sensus because I believe it is useful in guiding coun-
tries with poorly developed bankruptcy procedures
in efforts to improve them.1 One point I will stress is
that it is unlikely that “one size fits all“. That is, al-
though some bankruptcy procedures can probably
be rejected as being manifestly bad,there is a class of
procedures that satisfy the main criteria of efficien-
cy. Which procedure a country chooses or should
choose may then depend on other factors, e.g., the
country’s institutional structure and legal tradition.
One can also imagine a country choosing a menu of
procedures and allowing firms to select among them.
It is important to recognize that bankruptcy reform
should not be seen in isolation: it may be necessary
to combine it with legal and other reforms, e.g., the
training of judges,improvements in corporate gover-
nance and the strengthening of investor rights2, and
possibly even changes in the international financial
system.3 I will not discuss these issues here, although
they should be borne in mind in what follows.4 Also,
I will deal only with company bankruptcy and not
with the bankruptcy of individuals or governments
(local,state or national),even though some of the is-
sues raised are similar.
The need for a bankruptcy procedure
Firms take on debt for several reasons. Probably the
most important is that they wish to commit to pay
out some of their future cash flow.Whatever the rea-
son, there will be circumstances in which a firm will
be unable to pay its debts. Bankruptcy law is con-
cerned with what happens in such situations.
In the absence of a bankruptcy law, a creditor has
two main legal remedies at her disposal in countries
like the U.S., the U.K., and the rest of Western
Europe. First, in the case of a secured loan, the cred-
itor can seize the assets that serve as collateral for
the loan. Second, in the case of an unsecured loan,
the creditor can call on the court to sell some of the
debtor’s assets.
This method of debt collection runs into difficulties
when there are many creditors and the debtor’s assets
do not cover his liabilities. Under these conditions,
creditors will try to be first to recover their debts.This
race by creditors may lead to the dismantlement of the
firm’s assets, and to a loss of value for all creditors.
Given this, it is in the collective interest of creditors
that the disposition of the debtor’s assets be carried
out in an orderly manner, via a bankruptcy procedure.
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1 My approach will be mainly normative: I will have very little to 
say about why bankruptcy laws have developed in the way they
have. On this, see Berglöf and Rosenthal (1998) and Franks and
Sussman (1999).
2 See LaPorta et al. (1998).
3 See Rowat and Astigarraga (1999) and the 1999 IMF report.
4 Among other things, the IMF report suggests that one way to re-
duce financial distress might be for a firm and its bondholders to in-
clude debt renegotiation provisions in their bond contracts. This
may be thought of as a private bankruptcy procedure – see below.In principle, individuals could arrange bankruptcy
procedure themselves.That is,a debtor could specify
as part of a debt contract what should happen in a de-
fault state. Writing such a contract may be difficult,
however,given that the debtor may acquire new assets
and creditors as time passes. Moreover, the empirical
evidence – both the fact that firms rarely write such
contracts and that almost all countries have at least a
primitive state-provided bankruptcy procedure – sug-
gests that we cannot rely on this “private” solution in
practice.In other words,there seems to be a clear case
for the govemment at least to provide an “off the
shelf“ bankruptcy procedure, i.e., one that the parties
can use in the event that they do not write their own.
Goals of a bankruptcy procedure
It is hard to derive an optimal bankruptcy procedure
from first principles, given that economists do not at
this point have a satisfactory theory of why parties
cannot design their own bankruptcy procedures (i.e.,
why contracts are incomplete). In spite of this, eco-
nomic theory can guide us as to the characteristics of
a good procedure.
First, there is a strong argument that a bankruptcy
procedure should deliver an ex post efficient out-
come, that is, it should maximize the total value
(measured in money terms) available to be divided
between the debtor, creditors and possibly other in-
terested parties, e.g., workers. (We call this Goal 1.)
Specifically, a firm should be reorganized, sold for
cash as a going concern, or closed down and liqui-
dated piece-meal according to which of these gener-
ates the greatest total value. The reasoning is that,
other things equal, more is preferred to less; in par-
ticular, if a procedure can be modified to deliver
higher total value, then, given that each group re-
ceives an adequate share of this value (see the dis-
cussion of Goal 3 below),everyone will be better off.
Goal 1:Ceteris paribus,a good bankruptcy procedure
should deliver an ex post efficient boutcome.
Although Goal 1 will be readily accepted by most
economists, it is worth noting that it goes against
much informal thinking on the topic. lt is often tak-
en for granted that debtors will favor a pro-debtor
bankruptcy procedure and creditors will favor a
pro-creditor bankruptcy procedure. The informal
view misses the point that if, say, a pro-debtor bank-
ruptcy procedure is chosen,then debtors will have to
pay higher interest rates to compensate creditors in
non bankruptcy states.
The second goal concems ex ante efficiency. As we
have noted, probably the most important reason a
firm raises funds by borrowing money rather than,say,
issuing shares is to commit itself to pay out future cash
flow. For such a commitment to have any force, there
has to be some punishment if the commitment is not
fulfilled. This punishment can take various forms.
Shareholders can be punished by having their claims
wiped out (see Goal 3 below). Managers can be pun-
ished by making it less likely that they can hold onto
their jobs. But without any adverse consequenees at
all, there is very little incentive to pay your debts.
Goal 2: A good bankruptcy procedure should pre-
serve the bonding role of debt by penalizing managers
and shareholders adequately in bankruptcy states.
Next we turn to the way value is divided among the
claimants. A simple way to penalize shareholders in
bankruptcy is to respect the absolute priority of
claims (i.e.,senior creditors are paid off first,then ju-
nior creditors,and finally shareholders).Adhering to
absolute priority of claims has other advantages.
First, it helps to ensure that creditors receive a rea-
sonable return in bankruptcy states, which encour-
ages them to lend. Second, it means that bankruptcy
and non-bankruptcy states are not treated as funda-
mentally different: contractual obligations entered
into outside bankruptcy are respected to the full ex-
tent possible inside bankruptcy.
However,an argument can be made against absolute
priority.As a number of scholars have pointed out,if
shareholders receive nothing in bankruptcy, then
management, acting on behalf of shareholders, will
have an incentive to “go for broke,” i.e., they will do
anything to avoid bankruptcy, including undertaking
highly risky investment projects and delaying a
bankruptcy filing. For this reason, there may be a
case for reserving some portion of value in bank-
ruptcy for shareholders.
Goal 3:A good bankruptcy procedure should preserve
the absolute priority of claims,except that some portion
of value should possibly be reserved for shareholders.
Existing procedures
Although there are many different bankruptcy pro-
cedures around the world, they fall into two main
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categories: an asset sale (or cash auction) on the one
hand and structured bargaining on the other hand.
Asset Sale (Cash Auction) 
The simplest bankruptcy procedure, some version of
which can be found in almost all countries, consists
of a sale of the firm’s assets, supervised by a trustee
or receiver. Often the assets are sold piecemeal; in
other words, the firm is liquidated (having been
closed down). Sometimes, however, the firm is sold
as a going concern. Whichever occurs, the receipts
from the sale are distributed among former claim-
ants according to absolute priority (usually secured
debt, then varlous priority claims, then unsecured
debt, then subordinated debt and finally equity);
however, absolute priority is not an essential part of
the procedure.
From a theoretical perspective,a cash auction has an
attractive simplicity.lf capital markets work well,the
procedure should generate an ex post efficient out-
come.In particular,if the firm is worth more as a go-
ing concern than liquidated, a bid to keep the firm
together will dominate a set of independent bids for
the parts. On the other hand, if the firm is worth
more closed down,then a set of independent bids for
the parts will dominate a bid for the whole.
A cash auction has another advantage. There is no
haggling among the claimants about who should get
what: the firrn is transformed into a pile of cash,
which is distributed according to absolute priority
(or some other agreed-in-advance rule).
Although there is little clear-cut evidence about
whether cash auctions for firms work well in prac-
tice5, there is plenty of indirect evidence suggesting
that debtors, creditors and society generally do not
trust them. There have been discussions in many
countries in the last fifteen years or so about bank-
ruptcy reform, with new procedures being intro-
duced in some countries,but,as far as I am aware,all
of the discussion and changes have been in the di-
rection of introducing a Chapter 11-type structured
bargaining procedure (see below);none of the move-
ment has been in the direction of cash auctions.6 In
fact, I’m not aware of any group – management,
shareholders, creditors, or workers – who is pushing
for cash auctions. Thus, it seems to be a fact of life
that countries are not prepared to rely on cash auc-
tions as a bankruptcy procedure.
Structured bargaining
Because of the concern about the effectiveness of
cash auctions, a number of countries have developed
alternative procedures based on the notion of struc-
tured bargaining.The idea behind these procedures is
that the firm’s claimants are encouraged to bargain
about the future of the firm – whether it should be
liquidated or reorganized and how its value should
be divided-up according to predetermined rules.The
leading example of a structured bargaining proce-
dure is Chapter 11 of the U.S.Bankruptcy Code;how-
ever, U.K. administration is based on similar ideas, as
are procedures in France, Germany, and Japan.
The basic elements of Chapter 11 are as follows. A
stay is put on creditors’ claims (that is, they are
frozen: no creditor is allowed to seize or sell any of
the firm’s assets during the process); claim holders
are grouped into classes according to the type of
claim they have (secured or unsecured, senior or ju-
nior); and a judge supervises a process of bargaining
among class representatives to determine a plan of
action and a division of value for the firm. During
the process,incumbent management usually runs the
firm. An important part of the procedure is that a
plan can be implemented if it recelves approval by a
suitable majority of each claimant class;unanimity is
not required.
U.K. Administration was introduced in 1986 as “the
British version of Chapter 11“. An important differ-
ence between U.K.Administration and Chapter 11 is
that the U.K. administrator (who is an insolvency
practitioner) runs the firm during bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy law enacted in France in 1985 is also
somewhat like Chapter 11. However, the court,
through an administrator, has considerately more
power than in the U.S. or U.K.: it can accept a reor-
ganization plan without the approval of creditors (or
workers), provided it best ensures the maintenance
of employment and the repayment of creditors.
Chapter 11 has been criticized for being time-con-
suming,costly,too friendly to debtors and for not re-
specting absolute priority. The procedure could un-
doubtedly be modified to deal with some of these
criticisms. However, there are two fundamental pro-
blems inherent in Chapter 11 and structured bar-
gaining procedures like it. These problems arise be-
5 But see Pulvino (1998).
6 Countries in which a Chapter 11-type structured bargaining pro-
cedure has been introduced recently include Australia, Indonesia,
Thailand and Argentina.cause a structured bargaining procedure tries to
make two decisions at once:what to do with the firm,
and who should get what in the event of a restruc-
turing of claims.Unfortunately,restructured firms do
not have an objective value. Consequently, it is hard
to know what fraction of the post-bankruptcy firm’s
securities each group of creditors is entitled to re-
ceive. This is true even if there is no dispute about
the amount and seniority of each creditor’s claim.As
a result, there can be a great deal of haggling.
Perhaps even more serious, there is a danger that the
wrong decision will be made concerning the firm’s fu-
ture.The voting mechanism is fixed in advance,which
means that those people whose payoff ought not to be
affected by the outcome (either because they are ful-
ly protected anyway, or because they are not entitled
to anything) may end up controlling the pivotal votes.
As an example, consider a firm whose debts are ap-
proximately equal to its liquidation value. Creditors
will push for a speedy liquidation (since they will be
close to fully paid), while shareholders will hold out
for a lengthy reorganization (since they enjoy the
upside potential, but not the downside risk). De-
pending on the circumstances, a good firm may be
terminated if creditors have the pivotal votes; or a
bad firm may be kept going if shareholders have the
pivotal votes.
In spite of these problems, Chapter 11 has its sup-
porters. However, it is far from clear that a country
embarking on bankruptcy reform should choose
Chapter 11, rather than trying something new.
Bankruptcy reform
In this section I will describe a class of procedures
that have some of the same features as structured
bargaining, but are simpler. In particular, they allow
the claimants the choice to restructure the firm; but
they avoid haggling about the division of the pro-
ceeds. All of these procedures involve an automatic
debt-equity swap.They may or may not also include
an auction for the firm’s assets or a formal vote on
what should happen to the firm. The merit of these
procedures is that they replace bargaining among
claimants who have different objectives with a vote
by a homogeneous group of shareholders.
Basic Procedure: When a firm goes bankrupt, its
debts (most or all of them) are canceled.The former
creditors become the (principal) new shareholders in
the firm.A decision about the firm’s future – wheth-
er it should survive as a going concern or be closed
down – is made by the new shareholders. The firm
then exits from bankruptcy.
There are two aspects to the procedure: the decision
about whether to reorganize or liquidate the firm
and the debt-equity swap.We discuss these in turn.
Decision about the firm’s future
There are several ways of deciding the firm’s future.
We present three possibilities.
Version 1:
7 The firm is put up for auction (someone,
e.g., a judge, supervises this). Cash or noncash bids
are allowed. In a noncash bid, someone offers secu-
rities instead of cash. For example, incumbent man-
agement might offer the former creditors (the new
shareholders) a combination of shares and debt in
the post-bankruptcy firm. Thus, a noncash bid em-
braces the possibility of reorganization and/or recap-
italization of the firm as a going concern. The new
shareholders vote on which bid to select.8
Version 2:
9 The supervisor of the bankruptcy proce-
dure, a trained bankruptcy practitioner (BP), say,
takes over the running of the firm (she replaces the
board of directors). The BP draws up a plan (or
plans) for the future of the firm. The plan might be
to reorganize the firm,to sell it as a going concern,or
to close it down. (In fact, a plan is just like a cash or
noncash bid.) The plan is implemented as long as it
receives majority approval by the new shareholders.
(The bankruptcy practitioner may choose to put
more than one plan to shareholders and see which
one receives greatest support.)
Version 3:
10 There is no formal auction or vote.
Instead the choice of what to do with the firm is de-
termined by the new shareholders via standard cor-
porate governance procedures. In particular, soon
after the debt-equity swap, an election is held for a
new board of directors. (Any staggered board pro-
visions are eliminated.) Takeover bids are also al-
lowed through the elimination of all anti-takeover
defenses (e.g., poison pills).
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The versions differ according to the level of involve-
ment by outsiders, e.g., the courts, with Version 2
having the most outsider participation,and Version 3
the least.Less outsider participation comes at a cost:
managers’ jobs are most on the line in Version 2 and
least on the line in Version 3. However, all the ver-
sions put management under some pressure, i.e.,
they go some way toward satisfying Goal 2.
The versions also meet Goal 1.The firm’s future is de-
cided by a homogeneous group – the new sharehold-
ers – who have a strong incentive to vote for an out-
come that maximizes the firm’s net present value.11
The Debt-Equity Swap
The other part of the scheme involves how debt is
converted into equity.Again, there are several ways
of doing this. lf all debt has the same priority (e.g., it
is unsecured),it is natural to allocate all the equity to
the creditors on a pro-rata basis,possibly reserving a
portion (10 percent? 20 percent?) for former share-
holders.
Matters become more complicated if there is senior
and junior debt. The reason is that it is not clear
what fraction of the equity each group is entitled to.
The leading example of senior debt in practice is se-
cured debt. One possibility is to leave the secured
debt in place, and just convert the unsecured debt
into equity.12 This turns the firm into a solvent one
since the value of the firm is at least as great as the
value of its physical assets (which are collateral for
the secured debt).
Version A:Suppose there is a single class of unsecured
creditors and some secured creditors. Then the se-
cured debt is left in place, and the unsecured creditors
become the new shareholders (with some of the shares
possibly being reserved for the old shareholders).
Version A deals quite well with secured debt,but less
well with other kinds of senior debt, e.g., preferred
debt. Preferred debt refers to claims that society has
decided should have priority over ordinary debt,e.g.,
unpald wages of workers and taxes owed to the gov-
ernment. In practice, unpaid wages are not a great
burden and the post-bankruptcy firm can pay them
off by new borrowing. Taxes can be much more sig-
nificant, but a simple solution here is to remove the
government’s priority and treat taxes owed to the
government as unsecured debt.13
Another approach to dealing with debt of different
securities,including secured debt,has been suggested
by Bebchuk (1988). Bebchuk proposes eliminating
all debt, and allocating shares to the senior creditors
and options to buy shares to the junior creditors and
shareholders. Specifically, junior creditors are allo-
cated options to buy equity from senior creditors by
paying what these senior creditors are owed. (In ef-
fect,they buy out their claim.) Similarly,shareholders
are allocated options to buy back their equity by pay-
ing off all creditors. Note that this is a decentralized
process: each option holder acts independently.
Version B: Suppose there are several classes of debt
plus equity.Then the most senior class is allocated all
the shares.A junior claimant (including a sharehold-
er),owning X percent of her class’s claims,is allocat-
ed the option to buy (up to) X percent of the equity
from senior claimants by paying X percent of the to-
tal amount those senior to her are owed.
Bebchuk’s scheme deals ingeniously with the gener-
al case of multiple debt classes. In effect no junior
claimant (including shareholders) can complain that
he is being underpaid since,if he thinks that those se-
nior to him are getting more than they are owed, he
can always buy them out at the face value of their
debt. However, Bebchuk’s scherne has the undesir-
able feature that junior claimants must put money in
(i.e., exercise their options) to get money out (to be
paid).This may be a problem if junior claimants are
wealth-constrained. One possible solution is for the
bankruptcy procedure supervisor (a judge or bank-
ruptcy practitioner) to create a market for the firm’s
options and shares, so that junior claimants can sell
their options.The sale of securities in this market can
also be used to pay off some creditors.For a detailed
proposal along these lines, see Hart et al. (1997).
To sum up, we have presented two ways of carrying
out the debt-equity swap, both of which are in line
with Goal 3.Combined with the three ways of decid-
ing the firm’s future,this means that we have six pos-
sible bankruptcy procedures. (Further variations on
11To the extent that the firm is worth more as a going concern than
liquidated, putting the firm’s future in the hands of shareholders
should also lead to the preservation of workers’ jobs.
12 To be more precise, an appraisal would be made of the collateral
underlying each secured claim. lf the appraised value is more than
the secured creditor’s debt, the debt is left in place (it is fully se-
cured). lf the appraised value is less, then only the secured part is
left in place; the residual is treated as unsecured debt and is con-
verted into equity.
13 An even more radical approach is to eliminate the priority of se-
cured debt too, i.e., treat all debt as unsecured. For a discussion of
this, see Bebchuk and Fried (1996).these procedures are obvlously possible.) All of
these procedures avoid the haggling problems that
beset Chapter 11.
14
Which procedure is best? The answer probably de-
pends on the circumstances. For example, Version 2
of deciding the firm’s future, combined with version
A of the debt-equity swap, might work well in a
country with trained bankruptcy specialists (e.g., the
U.K.). On the other hand,Version 3, combined with
Version A, might work well in a country where the
judicial system is not very developed and/or the
macroeconomic environment is such that there are
too many bankruptcies for the courts to handle.15
In fact,because it is unclear which procedure is best,
a country could select a (limited) menu of schemes
and let firms pick from them in advance (e.g.,as part
of their corporate charter or debt contracts).
A final important point concerns whether the state
bankruptcy procedure should be mandatory. There
seems to be no compelling reason why it should be.
lf a firm and its creditors wish to opt out of the state
system and write their own bankruptcy procedure –
tailored to their own situation – why not let them
do so?16
Concluding remarks
In conclusion, it is worth briefly touching on an im-
portant “political economy” issue that arises in any
country that is considering bankruptcy reform: the
transition problem.Although we have argued that a
debtor and creditors should jointly favor a more ef-
ficient bankruptcy procedure, this may not be the
case in the short run given that firms will have debts
in place negotiated under a previous regime.
For example, some countries currently have pro-
debtor bankruptcy laws and are thinking of making
them more pro-creditor. Debtors resist the changes
because they are already paying the “cost” of pro-
debtor procedures through high interest rates. One
way to deal with this problem is to leave the current
procedure in place and introduce the new bankrupt-
cy procedure as an option, i.e., debtors can choose
whether or not to switch to it (if they switch, they
have to do so on all their debt contracts).In the short
run debtors may choose not to switch. However, in
the long run, as their old debts expire, they are like-
ly to switch if the new procedure really is more effi-
cient: they face a choice of paying high interest rates
under the old procedure or low interest rates under
the new procedure.
In fact, this example illustrates the desirable feature
of a menu of procedures more generally.With a menu
there is a “market” test. lf several procedures are
available, then in the long run the efficient ones are
likely to be chosen by debtors and creditors; the oth-
ers will eventually be discarded.
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